Questions tagged [kripke-models]

This tag is for questions relating to "Kripke’s models" for modal logic (or variants thereof) are the basis for many modern approaches to reasoning about knowledge and belief. For philosophers, by far the most important examples are ‘Kripke models’, which have been adopted as the standard type of models for modal and related non­classical logics.

Kripke model ( or Kripke semantics or relational semantics or frame semantics):

Given a nonempty set $~\mathcal P~$ of propositional letters and a finite nonempty set $~\mathcal A~$ of agents, a Kripke model is a structure $$M=(W,R,V)$$ consisting of

  • a nonempty set $~W~$ of worlds identifying the possible states of affairs that might obtain,
  • a function $~R:A→℘(W×W)~$ that assigns to each agent $~a~$ a binary possibility relation $~R_a⊆W×W~$ with $~wR_av~$ indicating that agent $~a~$ will entertain world $~v~$ as a candidate for the actual world whenever we assume that $~w~$ is in fact actual), and
  • a propositional valuation $~V:\mathcal P→℘(W)~$ mapping each propositional letter $~p∈\mathcal P ~$to the set $~V(p)⊆W~$ of worlds at which that letter is true.

Notes:

  • The development of Kripke semantics was a breakthrough in the theory of non-classical logics, because the model theory of such logics was almost non-existent before Kripke (algebraic semantics existed, but were considered 'syntax in disguise').
  • The main defect of Kripke semantics is the existence of Kripke incomplete logics, and logics which are complete but not compact. It can be remedied by equipping Kripke frames with extra structure which restricts the set of possible valuations, using ideas from algebraic semantics. This gives rise to the general frame semantics.

References:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kripke_semantics

http://gauss.ececs.uc.edu/Courses/c626/reports/Kripke1.pdf

http://therisingsea.org/notes/talk-shawn-kripke.pdf

74 questions
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Are there any invalid $S5$-formulas $\psi$ such that $\diamond\psi$ is valid?

I cannot find an example for an invalid $S5$ formula $\psi$ (i.e. $\nvDash\psi$), such that $\diamond\psi$ is valid (i.e. $\vDash\diamond\psi$). If there is none, then $\vDash\diamond\psi\Rightarrow\,\vDash\psi$ is the case, but I cannot find a…
5
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Modal logic: condition corresponding to $\Diamond \Box (A \Rightarrow B)\Rightarrow (\Diamond \Box A \Rightarrow \Diamond \Box B)$?

In normal modal logic, what would be the condition on the accessibility relation corresponding to the following axiom (the analogue of the distribution axiom for $\Diamond \Box$ instead of $\Box$): $\Diamond \Box (A \Rightarrow B)\Rightarrow…
mtphil
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5
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Symmetric relations and $\varphi\rightarrow\square\diamond\varphi$

I read that the schema $$\varphi\rightarrow\square\diamond\varphi$$ corresponds to the symmetric property (D. Palladino, C. Palladino, Logiche non classiche, 'non-classical logics', 2007) of the relation $R$ defined in a model of Kripke semantics. I…
4
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3 answers

An Application of Rooted Kripke Models in Intuitionistic Logic

Consider the intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). Assume that $A$ is a proposition such that $\vdash_{\mathsf{IPL}} (\neg\neg A \to A) \to A \lor \neg A$. Show that $\vdash_{\mathsf{IPL}} \neg A$ or $\vdash_{\mathsf{IPL}} \neg\neg…
4
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3 answers

Why is Normality an axiom in Modal Logic?

Why are we having $\square(A → B) → (\square A → \square B)$ as an axiom when we can prove* that if we have $\square(A → B)$ then we will have $(\square A → \square B)$? *$B$ is true in every world by assumption which makes $\square B$ true and…
user332328
4
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$\mathcal{M} \models \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \Box \phi$ for all $\phi$ if and only if $\mathcal{M}$ is transitive

Exercise 1.8.2 in Fitting and Mendelson's "First Order Logic" asks to show that $\mathcal{M} \models \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \Box \phi$ for all $\phi$ if and only if the accessibility relation of $\mathcal{M}$ is transitive. This is reiterated in…
4
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Proving $\lnot \lnot (\psi \lor \lnot \psi)$ is a theorem of intuitionistic propositional logic

Here, $\psi$ is some arbitrary formula. The proof I've come up with is as follows. Assume $\lnot \lnot (\psi \lor \lnot \psi)$ is not a theorem of IPL, which means there exists some Kripke model where $$\exists w: w \not\models \lnot \lnot (\psi…
3
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If you have a tableau proof for $\Box A$, show that there is also a tableau proof for A.

If you have a tableau proof for $\Box A$, Show that there is also a tableau proof for A. Here is my attempt but I'm not sure if it's correct: If we have a tableau proof for $\Box A$, it means that all possible worlds that are accessible from the…
3
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Rooted Kripke frames connection to $K$

I was reading the Modal logic book from Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. I read the following theorem (generation theorem 3.11): If $N$ is a generated submodel of $M$, then for every point x and every formula $\phi$: $$M,x \models \phi \iff N,x \models…
Paul
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3
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On provability in modal logic

Consider the classical modal logic $\mathsf K$, given by the following axioms and rules over a language containing the standard propositional connectives and $\Box$: A complete set of axiom schemes for classical propositional…
user369816
2
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1 answer

Does the necessity of identity also implies $(a \neq b) \to \Box(a \neq b)$?

I was going to ask this on the philosophy site but it doesn't support Latex which suggests me it's not a good match for this question. The question is about modal logic (where boxes mean "necessarily" and diamonds mean "possibly") and Kripke…
Juan
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2
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Intuitionistic proof of $((p\rightarrow q)\rightarrow p)\rightarrow\neg \neg p$

I need to prove that the $\psi=((p\rightarrow q)\rightarrow p)\rightarrow\neg \neg p$ is intuitionistically valid. I tried using the topology of open sets of $\mathbb{R}$ and an arbitrary valuation, but couldn't prove that $v(\psi)=\mathbb{R}$ or…
2
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Is there a simpler Kripke counter-model for this formula?

$\forall x \neg \neg \phi(x) \to \neg \neg \forall x \phi(x)$ is not intuititionistically valid. I can come up with a complicated Kripke counter-model as follows: Let there be a countably infinite number of related states $w_0 \le w_1 \le w_2…$ and…
2
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1 answer

Constructing a Kripke model where $p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond q$ is false.

I have constructed the following Kripke model for this problem: My idea is the following: Implication is false iff we have $ \top \implies \bot$. For world $0$, we have that $p$ is true. Now we need to evaluate $\Box \Diamond q$. For world $0$, …
2
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2 answers

About interpretation of accessibility relations in Kripke like structure

A Kripke like structure is something like tuple $(S, R, V)$ in which $S$ is a set of states, $R$ is the relationship between states and $V$ is an evaluation function that maps propositions to some value (i.e. in boolean logic $\{0,1\}$). Sometimes…
Doralisa
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