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Problem:

Let $J$ be an integer and let $I$ be an integer multiple of $J$. Let ${\cal I}= \lbrace 1,2,\ldots, I\rbrace$ and ${\cal J}= \lbrace 1,2,\ldots, J\rbrace$. The set $X_{I,J}$ of all $\frac{I}{J}$-subsets of $\cal I$ contains exactly $N=\binom{I}{\frac{I}{J}}$ elements. Now, consider the set $Y_{I,J}$ of all permutations of $X_{I,J}$, viewed as columns enumerating the elements of $X_{I,J}$. There are $N!$ permutations in $Y_{I,J}$. Next, let $V$ be a $N\times J$ matrix whose entries are sets in $X_{I,J}$, and all of whose columns are in $Y_{I,J}$. Let $\cal V$ denote the set of all such matrices. The cardinality of $\cal V$ is $N!^{J}$.

The goal is to prove that for any $V \in \mathcal{V}$, and for any $m \in \mathbb{R}_+^J$ such that $m$ is injective ($m_a \ne m_b$ if $a \ne b$) , there exists an $s=(s_1,\ldots,s_J)$ and a $p=(p_1,\ldots,p_I)$ such that \begin{align} \forall a \ne b \in \mathcal{J}, & \:\:V_{s_a,a} \cap V_{s_b,b} = \varnothing \\ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}, \forall k \in \{1,\ldots,s_j-1\}, &\sum_{i \in V_{k,j}} p_i > m_j \\ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}, &\sum_{i \in V_{s_j,j}} p_i \leq m_j \end{align}


Motivation: If I can prove the above, I can argue existence of equilibria in a pretty unique context with indivisible objects, fiat money and quotas.

This is something I believe to be true. I even have a rough Matlab algorithm based on Walrasian Tatonnement that finds $s$ and $m$ given $V$, and I've found $s$ and $m$ for hundreds of thousands of randomly-generated $V$ without failing to find one, but it often requires a lot of manual tinkering (messing with increments and such) and the algorithm doesn't have nice properties that lend it to an existence proof.

Anwyay, I'm stumped as to how to prove it. Even if you cannot prove it, any suggestions as to what I might try would be greatly appreciated.


Example and Interpretation: Let $I=6$ and $J=3$. For expositional purposes, let's put $\mathcal{I}$ in letters, i.e. $\mathcal{I}=\{A,B,C,D,E,F\}$. Then $V_{example} =$

\begin{array}{ccc} \{B,C\} & \{A,B\} & \{C,D\} \\ \mathbf{\{B,D\}} & \{B,C\} & \{B,C\} \\ \{A,C\} & \{B,D\} & \{A,C\} \\ \{C,D\} & \{B,E\} & \{C,E\} \\ \{A,B\} & \{B,F\} & \{C,F\} \\ \{C,E\} & \{C,D\} & \{A,B\} \\ \{C,F\} & \mathbf{\{C,E\}} & \{A,D\} \\ \{B,E\} & \{C,F\} & \{E,F\} \\ \{B,F\} & \{A,C\} & \mathbf{\{A,F\}} \\ \{D,E\} & \{A,D\} & \{B,D\} \\ \{D,F\} & \{A,E\} & \{B,E\} \\ \{E,F\} & \{A,F\} & \{B,F\} \\ \{A,D\} & \{D,E\} & \{D,E\} \\ \{A,E\} & \{D,F\} & \{D,F\} \\ \{A,F\} & \{E,F\} & \{A,E\} \\ \end{array} If $m=(3,2.9,2.8)$. Then $s=(2,7,9)$ -- the cells are bolded above -- and $p=(p_A,\ldots,p_F) = (1.375,1.55,1.5,1.45,1.4,1.425)$ meet the above conditions.

You can interpret the conditions as follows. Condition 1 states that no letter may be used in more than one column of $V$. Condition 2 states that all the cells above the bolded ones contain elements whose prices in terms of $p$ sum to greater than $m_j$. Condition 3 states that each bolded cell is such that prices in terms of $p$ sum to less than or equal to $m_j$.

Note that serial dictatorships will often work. By that, I mean that $s_1=1$ and that each subsequent agent $j$ gets the best available bundle that doesn't conflict with any of the players before. I even have conditions under which such allocations will always be an equilibrium, but in some cases it won't. I intentionally put this example in because it is one case in which there exists an $m$ such that there exists no equilibrium where $s_1=1$.

Ewan Delanoy
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Shane
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    So the integer $J$ must always divide the integer $I$ ? – Ewan Delanoy Nov 10 '14 at 17:40
  • Yes. That's correct. I'm looking for even allocations of objects to people. So each of the $J$ agents will end up with $I/J$ objects. – Shane Nov 10 '14 at 17:46
  • You also need to assume $(I,J)\neq (4,2)$, right ? Because in that case $V_{s_1,1}$ and $V_{s_2,2}$ can be disjoint only if $s_1=s_2$. – Ewan Delanoy Nov 12 '14 at 08:32
  • It's actually fine if $s_1=s_2$, but I don't think I agree with the statement. Consider $ V= [{A,B},{C,D};{A,B},{C,D};...]$ Here you could have $p=(m_1/2,m_1/2,m_2/2,m_2/2, ... )$ and $s=(1,2)$. Then $V_{s_1,1}={A,B}$ and $V_{s_2,2}-{C,D}$. Does that clarify, or is my question unclear (i.e. require editing)? – Shane Nov 12 '14 at 14:49
  • Your question says : "with no duplication among the subsets or in $V_j$". It seems that the example you just gave does not satisfy that – Ewan Delanoy Nov 12 '14 at 14:54
  • I see, it's very small, but it actually says with no duplication among the subsets of $V_{\cdot,j}$. That is, no duplication within a given column, i.e. if $V_{1,1}={A,B}$, then for all $i>1,V_{i,1}\ne {A,B}$. Can you think of a better way to express this? – Shane Nov 12 '14 at 14:57
  • I took the liberty of rewriting your first two paragraphs, let me know if I misrepresented anything – Ewan Delanoy Nov 12 '14 at 15:22
  • @EwanDelanoy - Thanks Ewan. The only issues I had you corrected in the second edit. While I agree that there are $N!$ permuations in $Y_{I,J}$, it's not totally clear to me that the cardinality of $\mathcal{V}$ is ${N!}^I$. It seems like something obvious that I'm missing. And thanks again for your edits - I agree they make the problem more precisely defined. – Shane Nov 12 '14 at 15:59
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    The cardinality of $\cal V$ is $N!^{J}$ because there are $J$ columns and $N!$ possible values for each column. – Ewan Delanoy Nov 12 '14 at 17:30
  • Oh yes - that's clear now. Thanks. – Shane Nov 12 '14 at 17:34
  • Sorry but I am confused by the notation: In the conditions above you introduce the notation $V_{s_a,a}$ What do the indices stand for? – Jimmy R. Nov 17 '14 at 16:58
  • @Stefanos It's certainly a bit opaque. $V_{s_a,a}$ represents agent $a$'s $s_a$-th most preferred $\frac{I}{J}$-subset of $I$. $s$ more generally shows how far down each agents preference ordering a given allocation is - that is, each possible allocation has a corresponding $s$. Does this clarify sufficiently? – Shane Nov 17 '14 at 17:52
  • Thanks, it certainly answers my question, but I am still confused :). If I do not give up I will come up with more questions... – Jimmy R. Nov 17 '14 at 17:54
  • Very related: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664613 The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes – Pburg Dec 08 '14 at 17:13
  • Pburg is not incorrect that the linked paper is related. However Budish's attempt to approximate competitive equilibria in this environment results from his inability to guarantee existence of exact equilibria, which would be implied (in a somewhat more constrained environment) by a proof of the proposition in this question. For those of you without jstor access, the paper is also available for free here: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/eric.budish/research/budish-approxceei-jpe-2011.pdf – Shane Dec 10 '14 at 01:20

1 Answers1

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It took me a while, but I've finally shown the conjecture is not true by generating a counter-example:

\begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline EF & CF & CF \\ \hline CD & BE & DE \\ \hline AB & DF & AB \\ \hline AC & AC & BE \\ \hline BE & BF & EF \\ \hline BD & BC & BC \\ \hline AE & AF & CE \\ \hline AF & DE & AE \\ \hline DF & CE & DF \\ \hline AD & AE & AC \\ \hline CF & AD & BF \\ \hline BC & BD & CD \\ \hline CE & CD & AF \\ \hline DE & EF & BD \\ \hline BF & AB & AD \\ \hline \end{array} Let $m=(11,10,9)$. The proof that no $p$ and $s$ exist to clear this as follows:

Step 1: If such a $p$ and $s$ exist, $s_1<4$.

Proof: If $s_1 \geq 4$, then

$$p_E+p_F>11,\: p_C+p_D>11,\: p_A+p_B>11 \Rightarrow p_A+p_B+p_C+p_D+p_E+p_F>33$$

But $p_A+p_B+p_C+p_D+p_E+p_F \leq 11+10+9=30$ for $p$ and $s$ to clear. A contradiction.

Step 2: If such a $p$ and $s$ exist, $s_1 \ne 3$.

Proof: If $s_1 = 3$, then

$$p_E+p_F>11,\: p_C+p_D>11,\: \Rightarrow p_C+p_D+p_E+p_F>22$$

But then players 2 and 3 must end up with bundles from $\left\{C,D,E,F\right\}$, so $p_C+p_D+p_E+p_F \leq 10+9=19$. A contradiction.

Step 3: Consider all remaining cases, i.e. those in which $s_1\leq2$.

Technically there are 12 remaining cases to check. Because once we fix $s_1$, there are four remaining letters to be assigned across two people. $ {4 \choose 2} = 6$. Since we allow for two possible $s_1$'s, there are 12 total possibilities. I find contradictions for the most salient ones below -- contradictions for the remaining ones are even easier to come by.

3.a (EF-AC-BD): Then $p_B+p_E>10$ and $p_D+p_F>10$ so $p_B+p_D+p_E+p_F>20$. But $p_E+p_F \leq 11$ so $p_B+p_D>9$. A contradiction.

3.b (EF-BC-AD): $p_A$ and $p_D$ must be lowest two prices. But $p_A+p_C>p_B+p_C$. A contradiction.

3.c (EF-CD-AB): $p_B+p_E>10$ and $p_A+p_F>10$, so $p_A+p_B+p_E+p_F>20$. But we need $p_E+p_F\leq 11$ and $p_A+p_B<9$ so $p_A+p_B+p_E+p_F\leq20$. A contradiction.

3.d (CD-BE-AF): $p_A+p_B>p_A+p_F \Rightarrow p_B>p_F$. But $p_E+p_F>11$. Therefore, $p_B+p_E>11$. But we needed $p_B+p_E\leq 10$. A contradiction.

$\ldots$

You'll note here that the problem arises from the fact that some players are seeing some sets of goods as complements where others are seeing the same set of goods as substitutes. In any case, thanks to all those that commented and thought about the question. While it turns out the conjecture was incorrect, I'm hoping that slightly weaker conjectures may hold, and working on those currently.

Shane
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