I'm learning mathematical induction and during this process I became impressed and confused by the manner in which several mathematicians speak about the logical properties of mathematical induction (for clarity, some utilize phrases like “complete induction”.) For example, Richard E. Hodel’s intro to mathematical logic details the method as “establishing” or “proving” that for any n ≥ 2, n is a product of primes. (Or, relatedly, let S( ) assert that something(?) is a product of primes. Mathematical induction is used as a means of proving that S( ) is true for all natural numbers.) I can’t help but maintain that, minimally, something logically peculiar and potentially wrong occurs here if we consider the words “prove” or “demonstrate” in the way logicians and philosophers consider them. One can summarize the dialectic found in Hodel’s intro as follows:
P1: The natural number 2 is a product of primes. (P1 follows from the fact that every number is a product of itself, and 2 is prime.)
P2: Each number is either prime or not prime (i.e., composite). (P2 is a principle of mathematics)
Assumption: Assume that every natural number is a product of primes. That is, assume, for the induction hypothesis proving that n + 1 is a product of primes, that S(2),...S(n) is true for all natural numbers. Assume that n + 1 is not prime.
Intermediary Conclusion 1: n + 1 is composite. That is, n + 1 = a x b. (P2, Assumption, and disjunctive syllogism)
Intermediary Conclusion 2: a and b are products of primes. That is, a = p₁ x…, pₜ and b = q₁ x…qₛ. (Assumption and principle of identity)
Intermediary Conclusion 3: n + 1 = p₁ x…, pₜ x q₁ x…qₛ (IC 3, IC 1, and principle of Identity)
Therefore: n + 1 is a product of primes.
The above conclusion along with the obvious truth that 2 is prime sufficiently establishes that all natural numbers greater than or equal to 2 are products of primes. However, I’m concerned that the “proof” for the ultimate claim that all n greater than or equal to 2 are products of primes isn't exactly logically viable. A pessimist may look at these steps and maintain, somewhat plausibly, that one’s established only conditional acceptance of the conclusion. That is, we can accept the conclusion, given acceptance of the relevant assumption. Yet, the assumption is the major claim induction aims at proving, so this would render mathematical induction in this case at least a question begging argument. In other words, in this case, induction assumed the conclusion p as a means of deriving some claim q functioning as evidence for p. This is question begging, a logical mistake according to standard understandings of logic. Or at least this is what it appears like to me.