2

In context on set theory & model theory of set theory what does exactly mean "metalanguage integer(s)"? Recall a metalanguage ( where one reasons about object theory phrased in object language) is as well a formal language which can can ( eg in ZFC) but not need ( object lan ZFC, metalan homotopy type language) coinside with object language.

When one says "$n$ is a metalanguage integer" or "$\omega$ are metalanguage integers" what is plainly asked concretely meant by this? Can it be formalized in precise terms?

A naive guess: per definitionem a language has an underlying alphabet + syntactic grammar which decides with terms can be syntactically legally constructed from atomic pieces, ie letters of alphabet, predicate symbols, etc. Does it just mean that $n$ and $\omega$ are parts of underlying alphabet- or terms made io atomic symbols - of the metalanguage and that's it?

#EDIT (added later motivated by Mauro ALLEGRANZA's point): Here a consequent question: I heard never the term "object language integers". If my naive guess above is correct and a "metalanguage integer" $n$ ( eg $n=3$ is indeed abbrev of $s(s(s(0)))$) is indeed just a term of atomic objects of metalanguage: then what is the problem with doing the same in object language, ie to construct in analogous manner "object language intergers"? Or, are symbols (regarded as "atomic" pieces) $s, 0$ always only available in the alphabet of metalanguage, but not of object language?

user267839
  • 9,217
  • https://www.math.uni-bonn.de/ag/logik/teaching/2016WS/Aktuelles_Skript.pdf – Tnol Jul 29 '24 at 09:49
  • 1
    This states: . We view the common mathematical language as a meta language which is able to speak about an object language like the language of set theory. The meta language has common mathematical tools available. For example induction and recursion on the common natural numbers, to perform the recursion in the previous schema of lemmas. We shall approach the problem of meta theory versus object theory in an informal naive way – Tnol Jul 29 '24 at 09:50
  • Maybe... consider e.g. first-order arithmetic: the symbols of the language are $s,0$ and thus the terms for numbers are $s(s(s(0)))$. We introduce (in the metalanguage) the "abbreviation" $3$ for it. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Jul 29 '24 at 09:53
  • This may be relevant: https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/110228/what-are-metatheory-metalanguage-and-meta – Mikhail Katz Jul 29 '24 at 11:00
  • @MauroALLEGRANZA: That's an interesting point! When we pondering in general about set theories, we are dealing on one hand with an object theory ( phrased in object language giving all the neccessary symbols & dictating correct syntax rules) containing predicate symbols, propositions (as $0$-ary pred symbs, constant symbols, etc and on the other hand the metatheory ( phrased in metalanguage, which has its own symbols). Metalanguage and object languege can be the same but in general not. That's the framework I understand so far. – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 11:06
  • @MauroALLEGRANZA: Now on your comment: You write that the language has symbols $s, 0$ ( ...which language, object or meta you mean there?), and we can form welldefined terms like $s(s(s(0)))$. And we can introduce in metalanguage(!) abbrev $3$ for the latter term. Question: Why can we do this only in metalanguage, and not object language? – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 11:06
  • @MauroALLEGRANZA: In other words, I read the term "metalanguage integers", on the other hand I never read about "object language integers". What is the problem there appearing? – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 11:12
  • Yes, we can, in principle... See Extension by definition. I say "in principle" because in order to enlarge the formal language with a new term for every number we have to add an infinity of formulas specifying the new terms, while in the informa meta-language the description of the rule is enough: "let the term $\overline n$ stands for the term $s( \ldots (0) \ldots)$ with $n$ pairs of parentheses". – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Jul 29 '24 at 11:56
  • @MauroALLEGRANZA: ah, maybe I see the origin of my confusion: Are you a priori not treat metalanguage as a formal language in strict definitional sense (ie consisting of alphabet + defined grammar rules dictating strictly which terms are syntactically "legal", which not); but more less loosely /imformally from viewpoint on retaining correct syntax rules? In other words, in metalanguage you assume that it still "acceptable with caution" to write something like $s(...(0)...)$ while syntax policy of any formal language strictly interdits it. – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 14:51
  • @JonathanXu: So meta language as stated there allows to declare induction for meta theory (so meta theory there is especially not considered to be first order), so it allows to form welldefined expressions like $S^{\circ n}$ (composition of successor fction) as terms in meta theory, in contrast such terms would be meaningless in language of object theory ( if we assume the latter to be first order)? – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 15:08
  • Metlalanguage integers are the same things that, in all of mathematics except for logic, are simply called "integers". What's different about logic is not the meta-anything, which is the same as in the rest of mathematics (so the prefix "meta" is redundant), but rather the fact that logic is (in part) about formal languages (just as other areas are about Hibert spaces or manifolds, or ...), so we need a name for those formal languages that we study. We call them object languages, and sometimes we use "meta" to emphasize that we don't mean "object". – Andreas Blass Jul 29 '24 at 19:13
  • @AndreasBlass: so "metalanguage integers" are just the "standard integers" ( ...to contrast them from those "integers" living in certain non-standard models which may attain "unusual" features, eg become uncountable) which presumably an undergrade would call "integers", right? But these integers are not implementer in formal language of ZFC, ie no ZFC formula can implement them or refer to them, right? – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 20:03
  • @AndreasBlass: The point is that from naive point of view the term "metatheory integers" naturally may suggest that these play some role in a theory which in considered context is the metathoery of a studied object theory. And this raises the question if and how these "metalanguage integers" are possibly related to that theory. But following your comment seemingly the "metalanguage integers" a priori have no connections to the considered metatheory in the context, ie they are not implemented in its language as terms or constants etc, right? – user267839 Jul 29 '24 at 20:26
  • @AndreasBlass, you may want to mention that what you presented was a Platonist take on $\mathbb N$. You may want to mention also that not all professional logicians accept it. – Mikhail Katz Jul 30 '24 at 07:50
  • @user267839 I attempted to reply to your now-migrated comments on my answer in chat, see https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/154396/discussion-on-answer-by-linear-christmas-metalanguage-integers. – Linear Christmas Aug 02 '24 at 11:33

1 Answers1

2

There are three distinct meta's as I have seen being used.

  1. Formal metatheory. This situation arises if you are working within some formal object theory, say ZFC, and wish to study the object theory itself (in some sense) from an external perspective. For instance, when working up to forcing you will encounter various theorem schemas which could be encoded as theorems in a formal metatheory, often PA, fragments thereof, or some mixture of a weak set theory and number theory. Note that there is no contradiction in terms even if the formal metatheory is the same as the formal object theory. So both theories could be ZFC.

    If the formal metatheory is PA in the signature $\langle \{0\}, \{', {+}, {\cdot} \}, \{ = \} \rangle$, then the non-negative metaintegers in this sense are (modulo equality) the syntactic expressions $0$, $0'$, $0''$, and so forth. One may define auxilliary expressions for convenience, such as $ 1 :\overset{\cdot}{=} 0'$, etc, with the assumption that such expressions are expanded into their definitions if need be or the signature expanded if useful.

  1. Platonistic metatheory. This is a sort of vaguely assumed to "exist" kind of collection of reflexive and intuitive knowledge about some mathematical object. In the case of non-negative integers, this is the theory of $\mathbb{N}_0$. We have the Chinese remainder theorem, infinitude of primes, and various other widely accepted results.

    The nonnegative metaintegers here are the Platonistic non-negative integers. We denote them as $0$, $1$, and so on, but the Platonistic integers are more conceptual objects rather than the syntactical objects.

  2. Minimal metatheory. A strictly formal theory still requires setting up. There is no path to a formal theory if we pretended not to understand what syntactic expressions are, how to parse them, what a well-defined formula is, or what constitutes a syntactic proof. We need to be literate. This is where mathematics must touch the physical world, and is a mandatory minimal background in setting up a formal theory.

    In setting up a standard formal theory, one will already have some collection of variables, sentence variables or individual variables (or even functional and predicate variales in higher order logic). In first order theories in particular, one typically assumes a (potentially) countably infinite metacollection of individual variables $(x_0), x_1, x_2, x_3, \dotsc$. Hence one will ask: what are these $0, 1, 2, 3$ in the subindices?

    They are again syntactic objects, and how exactly you set them up is up to you. I like the base one approach, where the integers are sticks. So $1 :\overset{\cdot}{=} |$, $2 :\overset{\cdot}{=} ||$, $3 :\overset{\cdot}{=} |||$.

    I refuse to pretend not to understand when two stacks of sticks are equal (same number of sticks when counted), how to add sticks (write them side-by-side), comparing is allowed (which has more sticks, taking minima-maxima), and so forth. I really treat them as minimal metatheory non-negative integers. Meaning that I do not consider these sticks necessarily to possess the full properties of the Platonistic metaintegers, rather I assume only as much as I need, the bare necessities. If it turns out on page 394 that I need a tad more, I happily pretend to know some extra (obvious) fact about how these sticks behave, and pretend that I had already assumed this additional fact from page 1 if need be.

  • Comments have been moved to chat; please do not continue the discussion here. Before posting a comment below this one, please review the purposes of comments. Comments that do not request clarification or suggest improvements usually belong as an answer, on [meta], or in [chat]. Comments continuing discussion may be removed. – Xander Henderson Jul 31 '24 at 15:57