There is some likeliness in the idea that being able to speak of large sets is cognitively desirable. Are not scientific statements supposed to be universal? This is, I think, the premiss on which rests your question , namely " large extension " $\iff$ " cognitive richness" $ \iff $ " logical strength".
But on the other side, statements involving large sets can be almost empty : consider Leibniz's statement " every being is one, every being is a unity". In French ( Leibniz used to write in this language) : " ce qui n'est pas un être n'est pas véritablement un être ".
So the question is : how to reconcile the desire of universality ( large extension) and the desire of cognitive richness .
As an hypothesis, I would say : a universal statement is cognitively rich if it expresses the inclusion of a large set in an ( apparently) small set ; or, put another way, the inclusion of an extensionnaly large set in an intensionnaly rich set.
Consider this example :
"Being a positive integer" is not a demanding condition, which makes the set it determines an extensionnaly large set.
"Being a number $n$ such that $n^3+3n -1$ is odd " is , to the opposite, a rather demanding condition. Because of the richness of the intension, one anticipates ( erroneously) a " small" set.
Hence , possibly, the cognitive interest attached to the sentence : " the set of positive integers is a subset of the set of integers such that $n^3+3n -1$ is odd".
Same observation for the statement : " the set of integers is a subset of the set of integers that can be written either as $3k+0$ or $3k+1$ or $3k+2$ ( with $k \in \mathbb Z$)".
As an aside, there is a concept that links the idea of strength of a statement to the idea of extension of an associated set, namely the concept of " truth set". For example the truth set of $A\rightarrow B$ is the set $\{ (T,T), (F,T) , (F,F)\}$. The larger the truth set, the weaker or the sentence ( following Carnap's Introduction to symbolic logic) . One can express logical implication in the follwing way : X logically implies Y iff the truth set of X is included in the truth set of Y.