In his popular book Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs, Kunen gives the following definitions on the bottom of page 145:
Let $\mathcal{A} = \lbrace A, E \rbrace$ be a structure for the language of set theory. Let also $\mathcal{A} \models ZF$. We call $\mathcal{A}$ an $\omega$-model iff there is no $a \in A$ such that $\mathcal{A} \models “a \in \omega”$ but $a \neq n^{\mathcal{A}}$ for each $n$.
He then proceeds with the following assertion:
If $\mathcal{A} \models ZF$, then for each formula $\phi$ in the metatheory, there is a corresponding $\phi^{\mathcal{A}} \in A$, where $\phi^{\mathcal{A}}$ is the interpretation of $\ulcorner\phi\urcorner$ in $\mathcal{A}$ (where $\ulcorner\phi\urcorner$ is a constant symbol—usually an element of $\omega^{< \omega}$—meant to represent $\phi$ in the language). If $\mathcal{A}$ is an $\omega$-model, then these are the only formulas of $\mathcal{A}$, but if $\mathcal{A}$ is not an $\omega$-model, then $\mathcal{A}$ has non-standard formulas whose lengths are infinitely large natural numbers.
Basically, I am trying to make sense of the statement in bold. First of all, is Kunen claiming that a non-$\omega$-model may contain non-standard formulas or that it will necessarily contain such formulas? If so, how can we reach that conclusion? It seems to me that even if $A$ has non-standard elements, we still have no way of knowing if $\phi^{\mathcal{A}}$ is or isn't a standard natural number of $A$, regardless of what formula $\phi$ we start with.
What am I missing? Some compactness argument perhaps?
Bonus question: What is "a length of size equal to an infinitely large natural number" in this context? I mean it's one think to talk about non-standard elements of a model, and a completely different one to associate these elements with "size" in the metatheory. How do these non-standard formulas look-like?