A previous question, Principal ultrafilters, asked for clarification of Markus Kracht's assertion that "In a standard model (where we allow quantifying over all subsets) there is a biunique correspondence between the individuals of the domain and the set of all subsets of the domain containing that individual (such sets are also called principal ultrafilters)" (p.12 here: https://user.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/~rumpf/SS2010/ComSem/Kra08.pdf).
The OP wished to know whether the qualification "where we allow quantifying over all subsets" was necessary, and why a standard model was necessary for the generalisation to hold.
Noah Schweber responded that "defining the map "Send x to the set of all sets containing x" requires us to quantify over sets of sets. It's not that this bijection would fail to 'work' in too weak a logic, but that $\textit{it would fail to exist."$\hspace{0.2cm}($my italics})$
Would such a function fail to exist in a second order logic with the henkin semantics simply for the banal reason that there may be subsets that $x$ belongs to but which are not part of the model since Henkin models are restricted to a proper subset of all sets?
Just what was meant by fail to 'exist' in this sense?
A further question: given it is standard for people working in the Montagovian tradition of formal semantics for natural language to treat names of individuals such as $\textit{John}$ as denoting the principal ultrafilters they generate, is this practice at all put into question if we are using a Henkin semantics and not the full semantics (and so can't gather together all subsets of the domain to which $John$ belongs)?