Defined negation in intuitionistic linear logic

Question

Is it possible to define a negation in intuitionistic linear logic, the way one does in intuitionistic logic, i.e. $A^{\bot} \equiv A \multimap \mathbf{0}$ (or, as it would be written in intuitionistic logic, $\neg A \equiv A \to \bot$)?

While I can prove, e.g. the theorem... $$A^{\bot\bot}\otimes B^{\bot\bot}\vdash(A\otimes B)^{\bot\bot}$$

...I cannot prove... $$(A\otimes B)^{\bot\bot}\vdash A^{\bot\bot}\otimes B^{\bot\bot}$$

...without copying the assumption $(A\otimes B)^{\bot\bot}$ to both subproofs $A^{\bot\bot}$ and $B^{\bot\bot}$. Even though I end up only using the $A$ and $B$ parts once, I still have to copy the assumption.

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Edit: For completeness' sake, the system I'm using is the one introduced in Philip Wadler's, A Taste of Linear Logic.

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Edit: Just to make sure, I checked, and $(A\otimes B)^{\bot\bot}\equiv A^{\bot\bot}\otimes B^{\bot\bot}$ is a theorem of linear logic under the axiomatisation on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (as it should be).

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Edit: Sequent Calculi for Intuitionistic Linear Logic with Strong Negation by Norihiro Kamide seems to be a relevant publication.

Answer 1

This is a late answer, but you made some good observations. Negation can be defined in intuitionistic linear logic, but it doesn't satisfy all of the properties of either classical linear negation or intuitionistic non-linear negation – that doesn't mean it's a bad definition! The definition you gave ($\neg A := A \multimap 0$) is fine, but an even better one is $$\neg A := A \multimap p$$ where $p$ is a fixed, atomic formula not appearing in $A$. (The main difference between these two definitions is that your definition validates ex falso quod libet (also called the principle of explosion) $A \otimes \neg A \vdash B$ for generic formulas $B$, while the other definition doesn't.) In any case, with either definition, one can prove double-negation introduction $$ A \vdash \neg\neg A $$ but not double-negation elimination (even though it is valid classically), and likewise one can prove the distributivity law $$ \neg \neg A \otimes \neg\neg B \vdash \neg\neg(A \otimes B) $$ but not the reverse entailment (even though it is valid intuitionistically). (There are actually two distinct, canonical ways of proving $\neg \neg A \otimes \neg\neg B \vdash \neg\neg(A \otimes B)$. Can you spot them?)

The fragment of intuitionistic linear logic consisting of just tensor ($\otimes$) and negation ($\neg$) has a surprisingly rich structure – Paul-André Melliès calls this fragment "tensorial logic" and has written a lot about it (e.g., see his paper with Nicolas Tabareau, Resource modalities in tensor logic). In particular, there is a good motivation for studying such a weak form of negation that comes from the theory of programming languages: $\neg A$ is precisely the type of linear continuations.