In his commentary on a case involving pornography in 1964, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart sidestepped the question of defining what it meant for a work to be pornographic, but then said "I know it when I see it." It struck me that this was a pretty good description of recursive enumerability (recognizability): he was asserting that he was a recognizer for the set of all creative events, broadly construed, that were pornographic. By saying that he wouldn't, and perhaps couldn't, define pornography, he was saying that as far as he was concerned, pornography was not recursive, in that while he could answer "yes" to the question "is this work pornographic?" he couldn't correctly answer "no" in all cases, saying, in effect, that the set of pornographic events wasn't recursive (decidable). In short, he claimed, metaphorically, the set PORN was in $RE\setminus R$.
Pedagogically, this metaphor might work well as an aside when I introduce $RE$ and $R$ to my students, but I'm not entirely happy with it, since it seems feasible that another jurist might very well assert that s/he could indeed determine, for all possible creative events, $e$, whether $e$ was not pornographic. The question is, is there a "tighter" real-world metaphor, where we could agree that determining whether $e$ is a member of $P$ is obviously possible, but determining that $e\notin P$ for all $e$ is obviously impossible?