Recently I read some papers related to RSA Brown16,AM09,BNPS01 and I learned that there is a variant problem of RSA is The oracle RSA problem (or one more RSA Problem) is $m+1$ copies of the classic RSA problem except that the solver gets $m$ accesses to an oracle for solving the classic RSA problem. The input is $\left(n, e, y_1, \ldots, y_{m+1}\right)$, and the output is $\left(x_1, \ldots, x_{m+1}\right)$, such that $x_i^e \equiv y_i \bmod n$. Before generating its output, the solver may select any $\left(w_1, \ldots, w_m\right)$ and receive $\left(z_1, \ldots, z_m\right)$ such that $z_i^e \equiv w_i \bmod n$
Note that if factoring reduces to RSA, then there exists a polynomially bounded function $m: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that The oracle RSA problem is easy. But [AM09] tells us that such a reduction is likely to exist, so should we not use the oracle RSA problem?
On the other hand, the generic model of computation (GRA:generic ring algorithm) used in [AM09], the relation queries they consider are equality queries, Why don't we consider more relations? Is it because there are no more relations? I don't quite understand one sentence in the abstract. ‘Our results imply that any attempt at breaking RSA without factoring $N$ will be non-generic and hence will have to manipulate the particular bit-representation of the input in $Z_N$ ’ Could you give me an example that is non-generic but efficient? How much impact does this reduction have on the oracle RSA problem?