ETA: The below answer refers to a previous version of the question which had $P$ removed from the antecedents of the conclusion.
Inference rules $\dfrac{\phi}{\psi}$, where $\phi$ is the premise and $\psi$ is the conclusion, are read as: From $\phi$ we can prove $\psi$.
Sequents $\Gamma \vdash \Sigma$, with $\Gamma$ called the antecedent and $\Sigma$ the succcedent, are read as: If all of the statements in $\Gamma$ are true, then also at least one of the statements in $\Sigma$ is true.
So a sequent rule $\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash \Sigma}{\Delta \vdash \Pi}$ reads as: If from $\Gamma$ it follows that $\Sigma$, then from $\Delta$ it follows that $\Pi$.
"It seems weird to me that I could use ∧L to introduce A∧B without having either A nor B in the assumptions."
Indeed, you can't. You can use $\land L$ to introduce $A \land B$ as an assumption if you already have both $A$ and $B$ in the assumptions. The rule doesn't allow you to drop an arbitrary assumption $P$ and replace it by a different one. What the rule says is that you may replace antecedents $A, B$ with $A \land B$. So your $\dfrac{P \vdash P}{A \land B \vdash P}$ is not a correct rule application. From "If $P$ is true, $P$ is true" we can not infer that "If $A \land B$ is true, $P$ is true".
An application of $\land L$ following the identity axiom would be as follows:
$\dfrac{A, B \vdash A}{A \land B \vdash A}$
Read: Given that, when $A$ is true and $B$ is true, it follows that $A$ is true, we also have that when $A \land B$ is true, $A$ is true.
What you're showing in your revised version of the question is a correct application not of the inference rule $\land L$, but of the structural rule called weakening on left ($WL$), which allows introducing arbitrary antecedents. Intuitively, requiring more conditions won't render an already established conclusion invalid. Here, since we showed that P holds under condition P, we can still obtain P if we additionally assume $A \land B$ to be true. It is crucial here that we may only introduce $A \land B$ as an additional (unneeded) antecedent, not replace $P$ with it; the succedent $P$ still depends on the truth of $P$ as an antecedent. But to answer the (intended) first question of yours: The premises antecedents of a rule sequent in the sequent calculus are not, in general, necessary to be present in order for the validity of the formulas in the conclusion succedent to hold.