This is trickier than it sounds.
One is tempted to say that, for any notion of "expressing" or "describing" something, the descriptions can be represented as finite objects from a finite alphabet, so there are only countably many descriptions. Each description specifies at most one object, so there are only countably many describable objects. In particular, since there are uncountably many real numbers, there should be real numbers that are not describable (in fact, many such numbers).
But this only works if the notion of "describing" is itself definable.
It's reasonable to say that a set is expressible or describable if it's first-order definable without parameters. (Note that first-order definability is not itself definable in set theory.)
Then we have:
(1) There is a transitive model of ZFC in which every set is definable without parameters (for example, the minimal transitive model of set theory — the smallest $L_\alpha$ that satisfies ZFC). In particular, in this model, every real number is definable without parameters.
(2) There is a transitive model of ZFC in which there are only countably-many real numbers that are definable without parameters (for example, $\mathrm V_\kappa$ where $\kappa$ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal). In such a model, there are real numbers that are not definable.
Example (1) above requires the existence of a transitive model of ZFC; this assumption is clearly necessary.
Example (2) above requires the existence of a strongly inaccessible cardinal; this assumption can be reduced in strength.
If you believe in a Platonist universe that satisfies ZFC, that's presumably like (2), with only countably many definable real numbers (and therefore with real numbers that are not definable). But this isn't provable, or even expressible, in ZFC.