I think you could make the argument that not only is this possible, but it has been done, and 2300 years ago at that! I am referring to Euclidean geometry. We think of real numbers as measuring the lengths of line segments; or, to use more Euclidean language, telling us when to line segments are congruent. In the Elements, Euclid frequently refers indirectly to real numbers. For example, Proposition 3 of Book I is:
To cut off from the greater of two given unequal straight lines a
straight line equal to the less.
You can think of this as explaining how to define subtraction. Given two line segments, Euclid shows us how find a line segment whose length is equal to the difference of the two given line segments' lengths.
You can also define multiplication and division of real numbers if you're allowed to designate a particular line segment as having unit length. You can do this with similar triangles; see this question for a nice picture.
Sure, you can define integers within Euclidean geometry as multiples of a particular length, but this is often not relevant. The Elements treats the concepts of similar triangles, area, etc., long before getting around to talking about integers.
You might object that Euclid was very nonrigorous by modern standards, but it's possible to formalize Euclidean geometry in a rigorous way that does not use the real numbers or natural numbers; see Hilbert's Axioms.
I think it's possible to imagine a society existing with a notion of length but without anyone thinking in terms of integers. For example, instead of counting out currency in distinct units like coins, your currency might be lengths of string of some type. You might argue that many animals have an intuitive sense of length without understanding integers, so in that sense I would say that real numbers are the more primitive notion.
If you want to actually construct the real numbers, say from the axioms of set theory, that is another matter. Maybe it could be done somehow without first creating the integers, but I'm not sure what that would accomplish. Euclid and Hilbert take the more congenial root of giving axioms for geometry without showing there's a model, meaning a mathematical object that satisfies the axioms.