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Is it possible to use CP-ABE to provide a layered (hierarchical) organization?

For example, If I have 100 records, I will encrypt the first 10 records (lowest level) to be decrypted using certain attributes. The next level can for instance decrypt up to 20 records.

Encryption depends on a secret $s$ for the first ten records and a different secret s' for the next 10 records. How could I give the higher level in an organization a key that could decrypt all 20 records?

I am trying to avoid giving people in the higher level the secret of the lower level.

Maarten Bodewes
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2 Answers2

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I can discern two cases here:

  1. A strict hierarchy
  2. A partial hierarchy

Using 1, "Hierarchical access control" as a term used with encryption implies that some users have more decryption power than others. Especially in access control modelling, hierarchy is usually "strict". This means that if A > B (A is "higher", and has "more" decryption power than B) then A can decrypt everything B can. If there are items B can decrypt but A cannot, A and B would not be on the same path in the hierarchy tree (i.e. A and B are in this case always comparable).

Using 2, the hierarchy would not be strict: there would be cases where A and B are not comparable, but in most cases it can be stated whether A > B or B < A.

For case 1, CP-ABEs offer a feature called "delegation". In a CP-ABE terms, this is relatively straightforward: if A > B, then the secret (attribute) key set of B will be a subset of that of A. (Remember though, that the mapping of real-life attributes to the scheme access structure may not be straightforward). Thus it should be easy to create a strict hierarchy.

Additionally, monotone CP-ABEs have the property that for an arbitrary scheme-supported set of users it is always possible to construct a hierarchy (possibly by adding virtual users).

However, if you want to use just cryptography to implement a strict access control hierarchy, hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE, e.g. https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/015.pdf) would be conceptually simpler, and probably more efficient).

Case 2 does not seem a matter of the cryptographic scheme, but a matter of the actual access control policy. If the policy does not include negative statements, most CP-ABE schemes will be able to support it (per encryption).

A completely another question is, what kind of access control features it is in general possible to enforce by content encryption only (Blu-Ray IPR yes, to some extent, but not for example general workflows).

Mikko_K_123
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Well, 1 way I could suggest is to encrypt the sensitive records with a more restrictive tree policy, obtain the cipher C and C', concatenate that ciphers with less sensitive records, encrypt that concatenation with a less restrictive tree policy and so on so forth.... Each level of encryption can be done with a new MK if u want a different secret s to be used each time. But you could of course reuse the same s, that could possibly result in collisions occurring.

In this sense a user who has all the requires attributes will be able to decipher the text till the deepest cipher level.

But keep in mind CP-ABE way more computationally expensive then KP-ABE, which means speed will be an issue.

Perhaps you might want to take a look at Fuzzy IBE as an alternative to implement that technique as it is much more computationally friendly when compared to CP-ABE (Here is a simple explanation on it https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/086.pdf). In this method, you can do it with the same s or without the same s but the difference in this version would be that the threshold of a key, as opposed to being the number of nodes that fulfils a policy tree of a CP-ABE cipher, would be a value explicitly set by one encrypting a , in this case, record.

Repeat the same procedure above encrypt records, while setting the threshold on each level to be smaller than the previous one.

Hope this helps.

INeedInsecticideToKillBugs
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